Force Levels
Discussion on the MarHist Listserv has triggered some thoughts on this subject. What force level is sufficient for a navy? This may at first glance seem like a stupid, or political, or philosophical question, but I think its answer lies mainly with psychology, and therefore to answer it is quite difficult.
From the point of view of theorists like Capt. Mahan, one may suppose that an adequate force level would be one that would be noticeably superior to that of your nearest competitor. Such a force level should lead a rational competitor to avoid combat.
This has proven to be inadequate. In the Napoleonic Wars, Britain boasted 108 ships of the line in 1796, while France disposed of but 71 in 1789, and some were no doubt no longer serviceable by the time war broke out. This is about a 30% advantage to the British and yet it was no deterrent. In 1914, Britain had 24 dreadnoughts and Germany had 17, even a bigger advantage percentage-wise, and of course, war broke out anyway. (Britain seized two Turkish battleships under construction in Britain that later served as HMS Agincourt and Erin, and in 1915, HMS Canada, previously under construction for Chile, also joined the Grand Fleet, giving it a huge numerical advantage.)
Evidently, a 10% advantage, what to the uninitiated would seem a significant one, will not be enough to deter war from breaking out, although it might be enough that the war could be won. However, in the two examples cited, the respective wars dragged on for many bloody years.
In Japanese samurai lore there is a sort of just so story (possibly written by Musashi?) that bears on this issue. A samurai visits a swordsmith. The swordsmith demonstrates his wares by taking a katana to a nearby stream, and putting the blade into the water, edge upstream. It's fall (or spring) and either fallen leaves or cherry blossom petals are flowing downstream with the fast current. They split, a foot upstream of the blade, and go either side of it because they "know" it's so sharp it will slice them in two just from the force of the current. There's a "moral" to the story that goes something like "The greatest warrior need never draw weapon." This would lead us to the suggestion that overwhelming superiority in force is necessary to deter opponents from challenging a navy.
However, we should also realize that in both examples, wars broke out not only as a result of naval rivalry (although that did exist at the time) but for ideological and political reasons, respectively, and indeed those reasons are much more common reasons for wars to occur than merely naval rivalry. It may be less important what the force levels are from a deterrence point of view, and we should be more concerned about being able to win the war should it break out.
From the point of view of theorists like Capt. Mahan, one may suppose that an adequate force level would be one that would be noticeably superior to that of your nearest competitor. Such a force level should lead a rational competitor to avoid combat.
This has proven to be inadequate. In the Napoleonic Wars, Britain boasted 108 ships of the line in 1796, while France disposed of but 71 in 1789, and some were no doubt no longer serviceable by the time war broke out. This is about a 30% advantage to the British and yet it was no deterrent. In 1914, Britain had 24 dreadnoughts and Germany had 17, even a bigger advantage percentage-wise, and of course, war broke out anyway. (Britain seized two Turkish battleships under construction in Britain that later served as HMS Agincourt and Erin, and in 1915, HMS Canada, previously under construction for Chile, also joined the Grand Fleet, giving it a huge numerical advantage.)
Evidently, a 10% advantage, what to the uninitiated would seem a significant one, will not be enough to deter war from breaking out, although it might be enough that the war could be won. However, in the two examples cited, the respective wars dragged on for many bloody years.
In Japanese samurai lore there is a sort of just so story (possibly written by Musashi?) that bears on this issue. A samurai visits a swordsmith. The swordsmith demonstrates his wares by taking a katana to a nearby stream, and putting the blade into the water, edge upstream. It's fall (or spring) and either fallen leaves or cherry blossom petals are flowing downstream with the fast current. They split, a foot upstream of the blade, and go either side of it because they "know" it's so sharp it will slice them in two just from the force of the current. There's a "moral" to the story that goes something like "The greatest warrior need never draw weapon." This would lead us to the suggestion that overwhelming superiority in force is necessary to deter opponents from challenging a navy.
However, we should also realize that in both examples, wars broke out not only as a result of naval rivalry (although that did exist at the time) but for ideological and political reasons, respectively, and indeed those reasons are much more common reasons for wars to occur than merely naval rivalry. It may be less important what the force levels are from a deterrence point of view, and we should be more concerned about being able to win the war should it break out.
posted by SToby at 19:28
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